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Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology. By
WILLIAM P . ALSTON. I t h a c a , N . Y . : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,
1989. 279 p a g e s . $ 3 4 . 9 5 ; $ 1 2 . 9 5 ( p a p e r ) .
Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. By WILLIAM
P . ALSTON. I t h a c a , N . Y . : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1989. 354
pages. $44.95; $15.95 (paper).
Those familiar with the influence of William Alston on philosophy of
religion and epistemology will soon recognize the value of these two
volumes. Both collections of Alston's own essays, they illustrate the consistency of rigor with which Alston tackles philosophical problems, as well
as the consistency of his position. T h e first brings together articles, all written since 1980, on various aspects of language about God (metaphor,
literalness, reference), God's nature (foreknowledge, belief, immutability,
simplicity), and God's relation to the world (morality, spiritual development). The second volume of essays, with the earliest piece written in 1971,
deals with foundationalism, epistemic justification, internalism, externalism, and self-knowledge. In both works, the introductions help to
delineate Alston's overall picture of his subjects—God, language, and
epistemology.
General features of Alston's positions quickly surface. First, and perhaps
foremost, is his realism in matters both theological and epistemological. An
illustration of the former is Alston's commitment to a literal core of meaning
with regard to talk about God. T h e latter appears in the externalist aspect
of his epistemology, namely, that there must be a reliability constraint on
epistemic principles so that when engaging in our epistemic practices we
generate mostly true beliefs rather than false ones. A second general feature
is Alston's antiscientism and antipositivism, illustrated by his willingness
to take seriously the questions of the skeptic. H e is clearly not a Wittgensteinian, for although the limits on our epistemic access to the world
may make us "epistemologically h u m b l e , " we still have access. Alston's
emphasis on the multiple sources of belief and, in particular, religious
belief, is the third general feature of the works. Influenced here by common
sense, realist philosopher Reid, and, to some extent, by a nonpositivist
reading of Wittgenstein, Alston encourages a broad approach to epistemic
justification, including argument and many types of experience.
Alston says of his positions in philosophical theology that they take a middle way. This can easily be extended to both works. Taking neither obscure
nor radical positions, Alston's writing in both epistemology and
philosophical theology is commonsensical. Examples from each illustrate
this point. In Epistemic Justification, Alston argues for an internalist externalism about epistemic principles. H e carefully spells out different kinds
of internalism: perspectival, accessibility, and consciousness. The first
claims that what justifies one's beliefs can only be "what is within the subject's perspective in the sense of being something the subject knows or
justifiably believes" (p. 233). The second suggests that what justifies can
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only be "that to which the subject has cognitive access in some specially
strong form" (p. 233). T h e third holds that only "those states of affairs of
which the subject is actually conscious or aware can serve to justify"
(p. 233). T h e first of these conceptions of internalism he rejects, for it relies
on a deontological account of justification that too strongly assumes that
we have voluntary control over our beliefs. T h e third he rejects since it
requires an infinite regress of justification. T h e second is Alston's chosen
position, but even here he proposes a very weak accessibility constraint so
as to rule out neither beliefs we typically take to be justified nor beliefs we
typically take to be rational. O n the other hand, the externalist aspect of
his approach claims that "it is both necessary and sufficient [for what constitutes an adequate ground of belief] if the world be such that the ground
be sufficiently indicative of the truth of the belief, both necessary and sufficient that this actually be the case, and neither necessary nor sufficient that
the subject have any cognitive grasp of this fact" (p. 244). T h u s he combines
what he takes to be the truth of two quite different positions into a middle
way.
In Divine Nature and Human Language, the middle way also emerges in a
number of instances. Alston argues in the first section that although we can
make literal claims about God, we cannot do so in such a way that all the
details are known. For example, in "Functionalism and Theological
Language," he suggests that "the common possession of abstract features
is compatible with as great a difference as you like in the way these features
are realized" (p. 66). T h u s , a computer and a new acquaintance can both
be "intriguing," where the term is used with one sense, but where what
makes one thing intriguing is quite different from what makes the other so.
And so with God. God might be able to make something, as we humans
do, and yet not do so in any way like the way humans do. A second example
comes from a later essay where Alston compares the Thomistic and Hartshornean positions on attributes of God and attempts to keep the best of
both. Hartshorne rejects the Thomistic proposal altogether, for he reasons
that this position requires that one understand the attributes to be logically
interconnected. Breaking the attributes into two groups, Alston argues that
Hartshorne's arguments linking them are faulty and suggests a "mixed"
conception of the attributes made u p of Thomistic (classical) and Hartshornean (neoclassical) attributes.
The books may be disappointing to readers outside the fairly narrow constraints of contemporary analytic philosophy because of the realist assumptions Alston makes. For example, theologians influenced by postmodernist
considerations will find Alston's emphasis on literal talk of God to be either
unacceptable, given the relativistic and pluralistic situation in which we find
ourselves, or simply out of touch with contemporary theology. There may
also be resistance to Alston's use of the technical terminology of contemporary analytic philosophy. Unless one is schooled in the terminology and
its implicit distinctions and arguments, it may be difficult to see the larger
painting for the dots of paint. O n the other hand, for analytic philosophers,
the discussions will not have this weakness. Alston has great breadth of
knowledge in philosophy and draws on that knowledge to generate a tightly
reasoned but measured approach to philosophical issues. His commonsensical but important distinctions need to be taken seriously, for they can help
philosophers avoid certain problems that mark the philosophical m a p .

466

Zygon

Philosophers of science, however, may find the works lacking a sensitivity
to problems and developments in that field. Contemporary analytic
epistemologists, including Alston, have not, perhaps, taken the findings of
philosophy of science seriously enough, at least in terms of how those findings impinge on the theory of knowledge. T h e realism implicit (and explicit)
in Alston's position is a large commitment for which the actual methodology
of science may not allow.
Nevertheless, the two volumes are germane to the discussion of religion
and science in a number of ways. Note, for example, Alston's comparison
between the scientist's use of terms in technical yet literal senses and the
theologian's capacity to do likewise (Divine Nature, p . 45). Also of interest
is the antipositivistic, antiscientistic approach Alston takes. What does this
entail for discussions of science and religion? Furthermore, the groundwork
is laid, in these two collections, for a forthcoming monograph on the perception of God, in which Alston will be extending his already prolific contributions to that topic. H e argues in essays already published but not
anthologized in the two books being reviewed (see, for example, "Christian
Experience and Christian Belief, " in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief
in God [Notre D a m e : University of Notre D a m e Press, 1983]), that the
perception of physical objects and the perception of God are on equal
footing epistemically. This position is to be further developed in the forthcoming book. Taken together, these two works and the third to come will
provide much that is valuable for the discussion of the relationship of science
and religion.
In short, these two volumes are well worth reading, even for those whose
background in analytic philosophy may not be strong, for Alston's insights
are helpful and his position moderate. Furthermore, the positions he takes
here have an important role to play in his broader epistemology of religion,
which is central to contemporary analytic thought on that matter. Alston's
work should not be ignored.
M A R K S.
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